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Abstract  
The majority of scholarly research on Rwanda currently focuses on determining the causes 
of and participation in the genocide. In this paper, we explore a variety of questions that 
have come to the forefront in post-genocide Rwanda. In particular, we are concerned with 
the prospects for peace and justice in the aftermath of the gross abuses of human rights 
that occurred and, to that end, we consider the potential uses and limits of restorative jus-
tice initiatives in the process of healing and reconciliation in Rwanda. We argue that re-
storative justice initiatives have moved the country closer toward reconciliation than re-
tributive measures, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. That said, we 
also suggest that the Rwandan government, despite claims that it seeks to achieve recon-
ciliation, has not shown a serious commitment to healing the wounds that persist between 
either individual Rwandans or the groups that they comprise. In the end, then, we make 
a case for the importance of pairing a comprehensive search for justice in Rwanda with 
a commitment to truth-telling and accountability by the victims and perpetrators of the 
genocide, as well as by current government officials. 
Keywords:  Rwanda, South Africa, transitional justice, restorative justice, genocide, hu-
man rights, apartheid, reconciliation, forgiveness 
In the past 5 years there has been an explosion of literature, history, and film 
chronicling the genocide in the tiny African country of Rwanda. This recent out-
pouring of interest occurred around the tenth anniversary of the massacres. It 
2   Ko h en, Zan c h el li,  & Dr aK e i n Soc i a l Ju S ti c e Re S e aR c h  (2011) 
1 Gourevitch (1998, 246) describes a visit to one such prison: “At Gitarama, more than six thousand 
men were packed into a space built for seven hundred and fifty. That worked out to four prison-
ers per square yard: night and day, the prisoners had to stand or sit between the legs of those who 
stood, and even in the dry season a scum of condensation, urine, and bits of dropped food covered 
the floor. The cramped prisoners’ feet and ankles, and sometimes their entire legs, swelled to two or 
three times normal size. They suffered from an atrophying of their swollen extremities and from rot; 
infection often followed. Hundreds had required amputations.” 
was common, in the preceding 7 years, to find large numbers of intelligent, well-
read, and well-travelled people with no awareness that an instance of genocide 
had occurred in their lifetimes; it is not so likely today. That said the majority 
of scholarly research on Rwanda currently focuses on determining the causes of 
and participation in the genocide. In this paper, however, we explore a variety of 
questions that have come to the forefront in post-genocide Rwanda. In particu-
lar, we are concerned with the prospects for peace and justice in the aftermath of 
the gross abuses of human rights that occurred and, to that end, we consider the 
potential uses and limits of restorative justice initiatives in the process of healing 
and reconciliation in Rwanda. 
Following the 1994 genocide, the predominately Tutsi-led Rwandan govern-
ment was left with the staggering tasks of instituting justice, restoring some mea-
sure of order, and fostering reconciliation within Rwandan society. In his power-
ful book about the genocide and its aftermath, We wish to inform you that tomorrow 
we will be killed with our families, Gourevitch (1998) ably documents the problem 
of how the new government, dominated by members of the Tutsi-led Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, might sort through the overwhelming number of ordinary Hutu 
who participated in hundred days of killing. As he notes, “Nobody ever talked 
seriously about conducting tens of thousands of murder trials in Rwanda. West-
ern legal experts liked to say that even the lawyer-crowded United States could 
not have handled Rwanda’s caseload fairly and expeditiously” (Gourevitch, 1998, 
249). Despite the impossibility of trials—due to the sheer numbers and also to the 
fact that Rwanda’s courts were shut down for more than 2 years after the geno-
cide—the government carried out more than a hundred and twenty-five thou-
sand arrests by 1997 (Gourevitch, 1998, 242). Over the years, the government has 
been much criticized by various human rights organizations for the prison con-
ditions faced by these detainees and for the amount of time that accused génocid-
aires are imprisoned without trial.1 Its response has been to occasionally conduct 
mass releases and, since 2003, between fifty and sixty thousand inmates have 
been set free; the most recent such release occurred on February 19, 2007, when 
eight thousand prisoners—deemed not to be masterminds of the genocide—were 
released “to ease overcrowding in the prisons and to foster reconciliation” (Asi-
imwe, 2007, 1). 
These releases, however, have been met with considerable animosity from 
genocide survivors and their advocates, and the released prisoners are seldom 
welcomed back into their communities. Given that a great many—if not all—of 
the prisoners are, in fact, guilty of the crimes for which they have been impris-
oned and that few—if any—have ever stood trial to answer for those crimes, this 
reaction likely comes as no surprise. Indeed, suspicions run high with regard 
to the motives of these newly freed génocidaires and often with good reason, as 
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Asiimwe (2007, 1) points out that “Hundreds already freed have since been re-
arrested after committing other crimes, many while trying to destroy evidence 
related to their alleged involvement in the genocide.” While the releases are un-
doubtedly helping to reduce the prison population, it is markedly less clear in 
what sense the government’s program is actively promoting reconciliation be-
tween Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. 
In this paper we suggest that a great deal more could be done to begin the 
process of reconciliation and ensure justice in post-genocide Rwanda. We begin 
by clearly establishing the theoretical groundwork for our propositions, setting 
out a clear distinction between personal and political of reconciliation. In doing 
so, we are proceeding from the assumption that achieving political reconciliation 
in Rwanda involves more than the absence of violence between former antago-
nists. While undoubtedly a solid foundation, we take reconciliation to mean a 
process that leads to developing a normative interaction between ethnic and po-
litical opponents based on mutual acceptance as distinct but equal co-members of 
the same, larger community. 
This background informs our perspective on the intricacies of the Rwandan 
case and our suggestions for it. We closely examine the traditional gacaca court 
system and the degree of commitment to reconciliation on the part of the current 
Rwandan government. Our research into these questions is supplemented by 
personal interviews, conducted in Rwanda, with those who have been personally 
affected by the violence. More than simply reflections on the horrors of genocide, 
the attitudes of interviewees with regard to questions about healing and reconcil-
iation provide us with a framework with which to apply to the case of Rwanda 
our analysis of the restorative justice literature. We argue that restorative justice 
initiatives have moved the country closer toward reconciliation than retributive 
measures, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
That said, we also suggest that the Rwandan government, despite claims that 
it seeks to achieve reconciliation, has not shown a serious commitment to healing 
the wounds that persist between either individual Rwandans or the groups that 
they comprise. Furthermore, we suggest that official policies adopted by the cur-
rent Rwandan Executive Branch have actively worked against the type of polit-
ical reconciliation for which we ultimately advocate. Drawing particularly from 
the South African case, we make an argument for the importance of pairing a 
comprehensive search for justice in Rwanda with a commitment to truth-telling 
and accountability by the victims and perpetrators of the genocide, as well as by 
current government officials. In the end, we acknowledge the idiosyncrasies and 
particular challenges of the Rwandan case, but suggest that, in taking measures 
to establish a more restorative justice, the government can help to begin develop-
ing meaningful reconciliation within post-genocide Rwanda. 
Theoretical Framework for Justice and Reconciliation
Given the challenges faced by the Rwandan political leadership and their lack 
of progress toward genuine reconciliation to date, a greater emphasis on restor-
ative methods would benefit the broader reconciliation process. In thinking about 
reconciliation, it is important to delineate between two types, personal and po-
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litical, both of which can be thought of as goals of a restorative approach to jus-
tice. Generally speaking, the former is concerned with restoring a relationship be-
tween victim and offender, while the latter seeks to repair broken trust between 
hostile groups in the aftermath of international or intrastate conflict. However, 
in using these terms, it is necessary to understand what fundamentally distin-
guishes one form of reconciliation from the other, the personal from the political. 
Delving into the profound dissimilarities between these two forms of reconcilia-
tion reveals the immediate priority of one over the other in Rwanda. 
Marked distinctions exist between what is generally personal or private from 
that which is political or public. The political philosophy of Kant and Arendt pro-
vide particularly helpful insight into what sets these two spheres apart. As Ar-
endt (1982, 74) argues, Kant holds that to be political is to act among humanity. 
Similarly, Arendt equates the political with the public sphere, or the polis. Thus, 
“the political” is essentially concerned with a group or society of people and 
ideas that relate to or affect them as a whole (Arendt, 1958, 12). Consequently, a 
personal act or idea only achieves a political status when it becomes public and is 
subjected to publication and discussion within a larger community of ideas (Ar-
endt, 1982, 74). 
The important distinction between political and personal realms applies sim-
ilarly to the concept of reconciliation. Personal reconciliation, simply stated, in-
volves a common understanding among individuals, a particular victim, or co-
victim, and a particular offender. It is limited to the boundaries of the private 
sphere and is not inherently related to, nor does it affect, others on a broad pub-
lic level. Considering reconciliation at the political level is perhaps a bit more dif-
ficult to isolate, however. Most broadly, political reconciliation is a moral con-
sensus, as it involves a common understanding and recognition of an event that 
took place between two conflicting sides. It is a prevalent and accepted “disposi-
tion,” finding commonality in a world that is “constituted by diverse and possi-
bly incommensurable perspectives” (Schaap, 2003, 3). This fact rings especially 
true given the deeply engrained “ethnic” divisions that took hold in Rwanda dur-
ing colonization and throughout its post-colonial history. 
In considering concepts like a “common understanding” within a discussion 
of political reconciliation, it follows that ideas like collective truth and memory 
are natural—and quite important—additions to the conversation. While truth 
and memory are commonly discussed in an individual context, applying these 
concepts collectively is of the utmost importance for political reconciliation (Soy-
inka, 1999, 81). Of course, because they can be shared truth and memory can be 
utilized in different ways for varying political ends. While they might be used for 
personal political gain by sowing dissension, they can also be used to develop a 
unifying, shared narrative. 
Similarly, Cochran (2002, 421) conveys the two-fold potential for collective 
memories. He relates two prominent types of memory that come to the fore in 
politics—prudential and mythic. Prudential memory is “veridical and literal” 
(Cochran, 2002, 424), difficult to manipulate but also useful for political decisions. 
Mythic memory, by contrast, is “nonliteral” and open to control, leaving it to be 
potentially either politically constructive or destructive. “There may be cases in 
which it is best not to have a good, literal memory,” he explains, “occasions in 
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which it is prudent to forget in order to clear space for new initiatives and alli-
ances” (Cochran, 2002, 424). Cochran (2002, 424) continues to explain the role of 
mythic memory in the construction of cultural ideologies and political identities 
as memories are passed on from tales and cultural influences from beyond the 
bounds of common political discourse. For Cochran (2002, 425), then, memories 
and rituals become the sources of power necessary to either prolong conflict or 
reconcile after it. 
The pursuit of political reconciliation in a public act of forgiveness could be a 
practical example of the inventiveness and mythic memory that Soyinka and Co-
chran discuss. According to Schaap (2003, 5–6), political forgiveness is a strug-
gle to settle the meaning of a wrongful act in the past for the sake of our common 
life as individuals within a community. To forgive in this way is thus to resist 
the power of the past to determine the possibilities of the present (Schaap, 2003, 
6). It extends respect for the other as the co-builder of a common world and is 
communicated in a way that pervades the general, societal understanding so as 
to be recognized by virtually everyone. In this way, Schaap’s political forgive-
ness is not found within the Kantian or Arendtian depiction of the political; it is 
not founded on the development of reason but on the recognition of coexistence 
within a particular space and time. Importantly, it does not ignore the judgement 
of the wrongness of an act; instead, it disregards the judgement that an action 
obligates one to consider the other as an enemy in the present (Schaap, 2003, 7). 
Political acts of forgiveness thus allows for political reconciliation as they create 
space for mutual acceptance, responsibility, and the opportunity to move beyond 
what might otherwise be considered irreconcilable differences. 
Part and parcel of broader reconciliation processes, whether they are on a 
personal or political scale, is the pursuit of justice in post-conflict settings. Pro-
ponents of restorative justice hold a very different view of criminal justice from 
the prevailing understanding of crime and punishment. As Minow (1998, 92) 
defines it, “Restorative justice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and 
victims. It seeks repair of social connections and peace rather than retribution 
against the offenders. Building connections and enhancing communication be-
tween perpetrators and those they victimized, and forging ties across the com-
munity, takes precedence over punishment or law enforcement.” While restor-
ative justice opens up the possibility of achieving both personal and political 
reconciliation, as Minow suggests here, we continue to distinguish between 
the two throughout this paper and concentrate on the achievement of the latter 
through restorative practices within a post-genocide, Rwandan context. On the 
other side of the same coin, we ask how the more common or traditional retrib-
utive justice initiatives have facilitated or impaired Rwanda’s journey toward 
political reconciliation. 
Retributive and Restorative Justice Practices
At present, both traditional Rwandan restorative practices and contempo-
rary Western-inspired retributive practices are being employed in an effort to 
provide justice to the people of Rwanda. But this approach can leave the impres-
sion that justice is simply being cobbled together or is susceptible to the way the 
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political winds blow. Further, it might also seem that the government’s stated 
commitment to reconciliation is largely rhetorical, as victims are left feeling ter-
ribly insecure while offenders are not held accountable for horrific crimes. Prac-
titioners and theorists of restorative justice argue that reconciliation will not be 
achieved by retributive practices, as these seek to establish guilt and punish of-
fenders rather than to repair the breach that has been created by the offense. As 
Zehr (2005, 79–82) points out, 
The justice process … requires dependence upon proxy professionals who rep-
resent offender and the state. This, in turn, removes the process of justice from 
the individuals and the communities which are affected. Victim and offender 
become bystanders, nonparticipants in their own cases …. The justice process 
does not seek reconciliation between victim and offender because the relation-
ship between victim and offender is not seen as an important problem. 
With this in mind, it is also unsurprising that there are often rules prohibit-
ing any contact between victims and offenders in Western criminal justice sys-
tems. These rules are intended to protect victims from further harm, of course, 
but they foreclose any hope for personal reconciliation at the same time. Because 
the retributive system either discourages or prevents victims and offenders from 
interacting with one another, stereotypes are maintained on both sides, offenders 
need not take responsibility for the harm they have caused, and victims cannot 
gain access to information that only offenders can provide. 
Victims and their loved ones have a deep desire for answers and, more of-
ten than not, criminal trials do not address it: “They need real information, not 
speculation or the legally constrained information that comes from a trial or plea 
agreement” (Zehr, 2002, 14). Frequently, victims want a reason that explains why 
they were targeted and, while there is often no such reason, they can benefit a 
great deal from learning that their actions had nothing to do with their victim-
ization. In the case of grave violations of human rights, as occurred in Rwanda, 
many victims want to know about the fate of loved ones or the whereabouts of 
their remains. It seems clear, with regard to offenders, that accountability is both 
important to and desired by victims and the community. Holding offenders ac-
countable for their actions, however, might also work to discourage future of-
fenses, as Zehr (2005, 40–41) argues that they are less likely to “believe that what 
they did was not too serious, that the victim ‘deserved’ it, that everyone is do-
ing it, that insurance will take care of any losses.” But a retributive system allows 
an offender to avoid taking responsibility for his actions: “His lawyer will talk to 
him about guilt in technical terms, and the process may encourage him to deny 
his guilt …. Meanwhile, he may see a psychological evaluator or therapist who 
will help him to understand his behavior in psychological terms, possibly muting 
his sense of personal responsibility” (Zehr, 2005, 69). Only when offenders take 
responsibility for the harm they have caused can victims begin the difficult pro-
cess of reconciling with them, especially by asking for and receiving the informa-
tion they need from offenders. 
Thus, if personal reconciliation is a goal then interaction between victim and 
offender is a necessity. Indeed, the Victim Offender Reconciliation Programs 
(VORP) in North America focus primarily on bringing victims and offenders to-
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gether to engage in meaningful dialogue about the harm that occurred. These pro-
grams were pioneered by Mennonite communities in Ontario and Indiana, and in-
volve “a face-to-face encounter between victim and offender in cases which have 
entered the criminal justice system process and the offender has admitted the of-
fense” (Zehr, 2005, 160–161). In this way, VORP works in conjunction with the re-
tributive system, but seeks a very different end. Rather than focusing on guilt and 
punishment, VORP emphasizes “three elements: facts, feelings, and agreements” 
(Zehr, 2005, 161). The key to the process is that both the victim and offender are 
able to tell their stories and reach an agreement together about how the wrong can 
be made right. As Zehr (2005, 162) points out, “VORP provides opportunity for ex-
pression of feelings, exchange of information, and recovery of losses while leaving 
victims with a sense of empowerment.” Benefits also accrue to the offenders, espe-
cially in putting a face to the harm they have caused and accepting responsibility 
for their actions. Further, since “they are real participants rather than bystanders, 
they too can experience empowerment” (Zehr, 2005, 162). The trouble, of course, 
is that the VORP model is atypical; more often than not, the offender does not ex-
press remorse or even admit the offense. In our criminal justice system, police of-
ficers must advise suspected criminals that anything they say can be used against 
them in court and defense attorneys routinely advise their clients not to testify at 
trial. While this is often an effective strategy when it comes to the adversarial crim-
inal trial—making the most of the presumption of innocence—it does little to help 
the offender take responsibility for his actions. Indeed, it promotes the impres-
sion that justice is something that is done to the offender, rather than a process in 
which he or she actively participates (Kohen 2009). 
Personal Reconciliation: The Rwandan Gacaca Courts 
Importantly, the VORP model is typically used to resolve relatively non-vio-
lent crimes like theft, vandalism, and burglary. Putting it into practice in Rwanda 
in the aftermath of genocide might seem to be setting the idea of reconciliation 
up for failure. As one co-victim of the Rwandan genocide told Gourevitch (1998, 
240), “People come to Rwanda and talk of reconciliation …. It’s offensive. Imag-
ine talking to Jews of reconciliation in 1946. Maybe in a long time, but it’s a pri-
vate matter.” It seems clear that choosing to engage in the difficult work of per-
sonal reconciliation, between individual victims and those who have harmed 
them, should be a private decision. Restorative processes demand a great deal 
from victims and, though they also offer much, victims ought not to be compelled 
to participate. For those who make the choice to do so, however, the traditional 
Rwandan justice system of gacaca offers a time-tested method for bringing vic-
tims and offenders together. Especially when compared to the retributive sys-
tem that largely fails to hold offenders accountable, this restorative approach has 
much to offer. 
The gacaca court system—often translated as “justice on the grass”—has a 
great deal in common with the VORP model. Historically, it was employed to 
deal with non-violent offenses, like slander or property crimes. It focuses on 
truth-telling, offender accountability, and restitution for victims. Disputes are re-
solved by a group of elders, who listen to the stories of both parties before giving 
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their opinions on how to resolve the case. More often than not, Temple-Raston 
(2005, 133) notes, “the case involved cows or land or water and could be reme-
died by reparations or a heartfelt apology.” The goal is reconciliation between 
victims and offenders, while also restoring the offender to the place he occupied 
in the community prior to the offense. Rusesabagina (2006, 9–10) argues that the 
central feature of the gacaca system is its conclusion: 
The two aggrieved men were required to share a gourd of banana beer as a sign 
of renewed friendship …. Whether you were the victim or the aggressor you 
had to strip yourself of pride and recognize the basic humanity of the fellow 
with whom you were now sharing a banana beer …. Everyone who showed up 
to hear the case was invited to sip the banana beer too, as a symbol of the ac-
cused man’s reconciliation with the entire people. 
In this way, the individuals arrive at a solution to their dispute together with the 
people in their community, who act as witnesses to the resulting personal recon-
ciliation and then reconcile with the ostracized offender themselves. 
It is important to note, of course, that reparation and reconciliation are quite 
different concepts. Offenders might be instructed by village elders to provide 
some sort of restitution to the victims and to the communities they have harmed. 
But personal reconciliation, despite Rusesabagina’s claims, requires a great deal 
more effort; while offenders must physically provide the restitution that has been 
ordered, it is often the victims who are required to do very difficult mental and 
spiritual work in order to begin the process of reconciling with offenders. Dw-
yer (1999, 95) argues that personal reconciliation will only be possible in cases 
“where people have particular desires about their future relationships, where ac-
tions manifest the sincerity of these desires, and where people are able to engage 
in face-to-face encounters that facilitate the negotiation of acceptable interpreta-
tions of events.” While the gacaca process, like VORP, involves an encounter be-
tween victims and offenders, it is clear that personal reconciliation relies on a de-
sire—by the former—for a future relationship with the latter. In order to achieve 
personal reconciliation, there must be a breach that is subsequently repaired. 
While the breaches in question in Rwanda are all related to the genocide in some 
way, it is also often true that the victim and offender do not have a preexisting re-
lationship. In cases where the parties have only the crime in common, personal 
reconciliation seems a very lofty goal, not simply because there is no prior rela-
tionship to reestablish. For although Zehr (2005, 181–182) argues that the crime it-
self establishes a relationship, personal reconciliation necessitates that the victim 
has a desire for the continuation of a relationship that stems from an offense. 
Unlike the traditional gacaca system, the present iteration seeks to establish 
offender accountability while also serving the government’s goal of catalyzing 
the slow-moving genocide trials. In its ideal form, the victims face the offender 
as he or she stands before the panel of judges and pre-selected witnesses. Resi-
dents of the community are required to attend the Saturday hearings and a sig-
nificant portion of the population participates by asking questions or giving im-
promptu witness statements. Thus far, however, the results have been decidedly 
mixed and have also yielded several unforeseen problems. Rather than trying all 
of the offenders who have been apprehended, the gacaca courts currently focus 
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on those accused of all offenses other than the major planning and directing of 
the genocide. These criminal categories have been periodically altered since the 
2003 inception of gacaca, which might seriously undermine the original nature of 
communal inclusiveness and openness that was supposed to characterize it. The 
mutability of crimes, especially since March 2007, means that many individuals 
accused of very serious crimes—such as multiple murders—can now be tried by 
gacaca in seeming contradiction to its original purpose. Furthermore, the accused 
have rarely, if ever, been able to contest allegations that led to the assignment of 
their alleged crime to one category or another until the gacaca trial itself. This is 
particularly problematic given that the category assignment is the sole basis for 
severity of punishment rather than providing an option for less serious charges 
(Human Rights Watch, 2008). 
In addition to these periodic alterations and outstanding procedural issues, 
problems persist regarding the individuals who preside over gacaca trials. Over-
seeing the trial process are nine elected community officials who also determine 
the final outcome and sentence of the offender. These officials have very little—
if any—legal training and hold their positions because they are respected in their 
communities. However, the issues before them and the judgments they pro-
nounce are often complex legal matters, such as the determination of intent to ex-
terminate (Sarkin, 2001, 161). In certain jurisdictions, there also exists a perception 
of unfairness due to the high number of Tutsi judges. It might be the case either 
that the community genuinely felt these individuals were best suited for this role 
or that there were a very limited number of potential Hutu judges due to high 
rates of incarceration; regardless, this perception is notably better than those ju-
risdictions where elected judges themselves were later implicated in the genocide 
(cf. Des Forges, 1999). Further, there are concerns that the courts are used to set-
tle personal scores, especially because of the lack of existing legal safeguards (cf. 
Temple-Raston, 2005, 110–113; 137–140), and much is made of the emphasis that 
is placed on the virtues of confession. Indeed, some suggest that confessing to a 
crime one did not commit is the most expeditious way to get through the quag-
mire of the Rwandan justice system (Neuffer, 2001, 260–262). In one such case, Jo-
seph N. explains the problem he faced after 6 years of imprisonment: “what do 
you do if you really didn’t kill someone, and people in your community claim 
you did? Do you lie? Do you confess just so you can get out of prison?” (qtd. 
in Temple-Raston, 2005, 138). In a recent comparative and relatively comprehen-
sive case study on transitional justice, Fletcher, Weinstein, and Rowen (2009, 210) 
note the importance of local remedies that adhere to a society’s cultural traditions 
within the transitional justice process. While it may ostensibly seem that gacaca 
falls within this description, the authors take particular time to observe, “we must 
caution, however, that what is local must not be subverted by the political as in 
the case of Rwanda” (Fletcher et al., 2009, 210). Notably, Rwanda was not one of 
the seven transitional justice cases examined in this study. Taken together, these 
shortcomings undermine hopes of a gacaca process that emphasizes accountabil-
ity while still promoting a sound form of personal reconciliation between génocid-
aires and their victims. 
While these criticisms are troubling, it is important to also consider both the 
national and international alternatives to gacaca justice. Whereas the mandate of 
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2 Allegations of massacres committed by the RPF are not limited to reprisal killings in the aftermath 
of the genocide. Des Forges (1999) writes of RPF soldiers implicated in the killing of hundreds of ci-
vilians in the Ruhengeri prefecture, with some of the killings linked to the political beliefs of the 
victims. 
the gacaca system does not extend to prosecuting the architects of the genocide, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) focuses solely on these 
offenders. The failure of the international community to properly attach the la-
bel of genocide to the hundred-day massacre while it was happening resulted in 
significant distrust of the United Nations by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
Thus, in the genocide’s aftermath, the idea of a tribunal sanctioned by the inter-
national community was viewed with a great deal of skepticism and even out-
right distrust by the newly formed Rwandan government (Neuffer, 2001, 129). 
Indeed, when the official Security Council vote was taken on the issue, in No-
vember 1994, Rwanda—which ironically held a rotating seat—was the only coun-
try to cast a vote in opposition. Apart from its general misgivings about the in-
ternational community, the RPF-led government also voiced several practical 
concerns with the proposed tribunal. In particular, the tribunal’s judges would 
not be Rwandans, to avoid concerns over ethnic identity and partiality; decisions 
about prosecutions and procedures would be made by international officials; 
and life imprisonment, rather than death, was the toughest penalty that any of-
fender could face (Cobban, 2007, 41). Finally, and perhaps most importantly for 
the question of reconciliation, Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the site for the tri-
bunal in an attempt by the UN to avoid any perceptions of “victors’ justice” that 
might have arisen from a tribunal in Kigali, Rwanda. The consequence, however, 
was that the new government came to view the tribunal as an assault on both its 
legitimacy and sovereignty. Further, the ICTR is little more than a distant mirage 
of a judicial process for many Rwandans (Humphrey, 2003, 499–503). The lack of 
mass media cooperation between Tanzania and Rwanda has resulted in consider-
able ignorance about the trials amongst those who would be most interested. In 
fact, many Rwandans refer to the proceedings as “the Arusha trials,” showing a 
clear lack of ownership or familiarity with the ICTR. 
Of course, though persistent, these are far from the only problems arising 
from attempts at transitional justice in Rwanda. Domestic criminal trials began al-
most immediately after the Rwandan judicial system was restored in 1996; these, 
however, were marred by allegations of partiality and lacked independence of 
prominent court officials. As the trials proceeded slowly, the government decided 
to make the process of justice more visible to the populace through a number of 
public executions. Roughly 4 years after the genocide, 21 higher-level génocid-
aires were executed by firing squad to the sound of cheers from Tutsi-dominated 
crowds. The executions took place at four locations across the country and were 
met with condemnation from the UN and various international human rights or-
ganizations (Standley, 1998, 1). In addition to these executions, there are also al-
legations of reprisal killings of civilians by RPF soldiers at public meeting places. 
In Kinyarwanda, the native language, the term kwitaba inama means “to attend a 
meeting.” In the aftermath of the genocide, when these killings took place, there 
was a dark joke that kwitaba inama could be used interchangeably with kwitaba 
imana, which means “to die” (cf. Des Forges, 1999).2 Paul Kagame and other for-
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mer RPF officials have understandably decided to distance themselves from 
any reprisal killings against Hutus since the genocide. Despite this decision, the 
Rwandan government has not been particularly vigorous in pursuing prosecu-
tion of RPF war crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2008). This is not meant to min-
imize the genocide or crimes by the interahamwe; the degree and extent of the 
atrocities committed by the interahamwe militia were by all measures worse than 
those of the RPF. Rather, RPF impunity is important because it symbolizes the 
general manner in which the Rwandan government has approached the question 
of reconciliation. It is also important to note that the RPF came to power with 
few limitations that would restrict the establishment of a constitution and post-
conflict policy that centered on healing, reconciliation, and respect for human 
rights. As Jeremy Sarkin (2001, 146) notes, after the genocide, “the new govern-
ment has the widest discretion to decide how it should deal with the past includ-
ing unfettered power to bring the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice.” 
Rather than using their role instrumentally to set a foundation for future recon-
ciliation, the RPF instituted retributive policies that undermined the possibility of 
forgiveness and might even have perpetuated the cycle of violence between Hutu 
and Tutsi. In choosing to imprison more than a hundred thousand Hutu without 
charges or trials, pursue death sentences against some génocidaires, and also arbi-
trarily release thousands of other potentially guilty Hutu, the Tutsi-led govern-
ment has done little practical work to emphasize personal reconciliation between 
individual victims and offenders. 
Political Reconciliation: Building Trust Between Hutu and Tutsi
Of course, many victims—perhaps most—have no desire to build or reestab-
lish a relationship with the offenders who harmed them. But this should not be 
considered a stumbling block for the achievement of political reconciliation be-
tween groups comprised of those victims and offenders. Speaking to this point 
is Marius Schoon, a South African whose wife and daughter were killed in 1984 
by a letter-bomb intended for him: “On the whole I’m in favor of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. I think it’s going to bring about national reconcili-
ation. In my case, it’s not going to bring about personal reconciliation” (qtd. in 
Dwyer, 1999, 95). Though the latter seems impossible to Schoon, it is particularly 
noteworthy that he views a restorative process—the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission—as a vehicle for the achievement of political reconciliation between 
black and white South Africans. For although personal reconciliation requires a 
private decision on the part of victims, we want to argue that political reconcil-
iation, between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, cannot be accomplished as a private 
matter. Instead, publicity is a necessary element, as highlighted by the South Af-
rican model with its emphasis on a public accounting of apartheid era crimes. 
As Tutu (2000, 51) notes, both victim and offender hearings were conducted be-
fore attentive audiences, in person, on the radio, and “in the full glare of televi-
sion lights.” This public airing of the country’s dark past made it difficult—if not 
impossible—for white South Africans to cling to a narrative that failed to include 
the daily injustices and horrors experienced by their black countrymen. This sort 
of publicity, then, speaks to the sort of reconciliation envisioned by Dwyer (1999, 
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89), whose “account of reconciliation … is that of bringing apparently incompati-
ble descriptions of events into narrative equilibrium.” While this focus on the cre-
ation of a common historical narrative is undoubtedly important in Rwanda—
as it was in South Africa and as it is in the aftermath of any offense—we argue 
that both personal and political reconciliation require a good deal more. As Dw-
yer (1999, 95) herself notes of South Africa, “reconciliation at the macro-level re-
quires the credibility that can be established only by implementation of social and 
economic programs that concretely address the substantive injustices of apart-
heid.” While we address this suggestion from Dwyer in the concluding section 
of our paper, applying it to the Rwandan case, we also want to argue that polit-
ical reconciliation cannot proceed in the absence of both a public apology from 
prominent offenders and the offering of forgiveness from prominent victims—
the aforementioned act of political forgiveness. 
As Govier (2002, 144) argues, “In the aftermath of serious conflict, for recon-
ciliation to be lasting, some kind of trust must be built, and for that to happen, 
attitudes must change—hence the relevance for forgiveness.” This understand-
ing of political reconciliation paints quite a different picture from the one de-
scribed by Dwyer (1999, 89), as her “narrative equilibrium” might be achieved 
even in the absence of trust between antagonistic groups. She suggests that “Co-
herent incorporation of an unpleasant fact, or a new belief about an enemy, into 
the story of one’s life might involve the issuance of an apology and an offer of 
forgiveness. But it need not” (Dwyer, 1999, 96). We agree that individual victims 
need not forgive offenders, repentant or not, in order for political reconciliation 
to succeed; personal reconciliation is not a requirement for political reconcilia-
tion, though the achievement of the former certainly would not impact the latter 
negatively. However, in the absence of public apology and forgiveness by antag-
onistic groups, political reconciliation means little more than non-violent co-ex-
istence. Though the achievement of non-violent co-existence is undoubtedly a 
marked improvement over the continuation of hostilities, the sort of reconcilia-
tion that we have in mind is a far more robust—and longer lasting—one. As Gov-
ier (2002, 144) argues, 
people cannot come together in a lasting way and co-operate as they will need 
to in a jointly run society if they remain angry, vengeful, suspicious, and in-
secure. The need for forgiveness lies in its relevance to two very practical as-
pects of reconciliation: co-operation and sustainability. Institution-building, 
economic development, and political processes require that people and people 
work effectively together. To do so, they need to co-operate and trust each other in 
significant respects. 
In order to achieve political reconciliation of this sort, well-known victims must 
be willing to publicly forgive and notable offenders must publicly apologize or 
accept the proffered forgiveness, thereby acknowledging the wrongs they have 
committed. These are individual actors, of course, but it is important to recognize 
that their actions are also undertaken on behalf of their respective groups. While 
it might be the case that many individual victims will not forgive those offenders 
who directly harmed them, the public forgiveness offered by a representative of 
the victimized group should not be considered illegitimate. On the other side of 
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3 By drawing a limited comparison between the political leadership in post-apartheid South Africa 
and in post-genocide Rwanda, the problem often arises of applying a generalized transitional jus-
tice framework to extremely particular post-conflict scenarios. This specific issue extends beyond 
the political reconciliation theory we offer, and often has implications on attempting to compara-
tively study other cases of transitional justice. Fletcher et al. (2009, 209) observe that transitional jus-
tice theorists, and more importantly practitioners, “may overlook the limitations and history of the 
context in which these interventions will unfold.” In short, “there is no tabula rasa society upon 
which transitional justice is inscribed. Context matters and it matters considerably” (Fletcher et al., 
2009, 209). This point is especially critical to highlight because it undermines the mistaken notion 
that any common transitional justice mechanism is a good one. Transitional justice, and specifically 
the process of political reconciliation in Rwanda, must be carried out with due diligence paid to the 
historical underpinnings of the conflict and the contextual background against which the genocide 
was perpetrated. That said, characteristically, Rwanda and South Africa diverged drastically from 
one another as post-conflict states. At the time of the conflict, South Africa was industrialized in ur-
ban areas, and had a comparatively strong rule of law and an established Western legal tradition 
(Fletcher et al., 2009, 188). Furthermore, the conflict in South Africa was ended by an internally ne-
gotiated political compromise and the country has not experienced any substantive international in-
tervention to implement transitional justice processes. The Rwandan case stands in stark contrast on 
all fronts, including the choice to eschew a truth commission in favor of individual trials. These dif-
ferences, however, do not undermine our suggestions about political reconciliation for Rwanda’s 
political leadership. While acknowledging the importance of actions by the political leadership in 
divided societies emerging from conflict, we also recognize that these actions do not constitute a sil-
ver bullet for reconciliation efforts. The issuance of a public apology and offering of public forgive-
ness by prominent officials and perpetrators does not guarantee that political reconciliation will be 
achieved; instead, it is a vital step in an evolutionary process. Mandela’s actions did not guarantee a 
sustainable peace in South Africa, but did demonstrate a strong commitment to addressing past vio-
lations and building a more cohesive South Africa. 
4 Govier (2002, 69) offers several examples: “On the first day of his release, he stopped his car to greet 
a white couple on the road. In an early speech, he thanked Black Sash, a white women’s organi-
zation that had worked against apartheid, his first white employer, Lazar Sidelsky, and the white 
people who had helped him during his years in jail. In a fashionable restaurant the day after his 
release, Mandela went around the dining room to shake hands with white businessmen, assuring 
them of his friendly attitude and desire to see a non-racial South Africa in which all people, includ-
ing whites, would have an important role to play.” 
the same coin, remorse expressed by representatives of the offending group can 
move political reconciliation forward, even when many individual offenders do 
not yet accept their own culpability. 
The South African case is a very helpful one, once again, in setting out the 
prospects for political reconciliation even in the absence of personal reconcili-
ation.3 Though achieving the latter would be difficult, if not impossible, in the 
absence of individual apology and forgiveness, the latter might well be accom-
plished through the actions of leaders who recognize the importance of re-es-
tablishing trust and cooperation. Perhaps the best—and best known—exam-
ple is that of Nelson Mandela, whose actions after his release from prison were 
clearly undertaken to make a political statement.4 While many black South Af-
ricans were not prepared to extend their hands in forgiveness to white South 
Africans, Mandela sought to do so on their behalf. Nor was Mandela’s forgive-
ness offered in response to an apology from his oppressors, many of whom 
were unapologetic. This unilateral forgiveness, offered by a prominent victim 
of apartheid, was the beginning of a process that culminated in the new South 
African constitution, with its emphasis on national unity, and in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, tasked with the promotion of political reconcilia-
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tion. “The forgiveness that Mandela extended to his former enemies, especially 
whites, was a powerful factor providing South Africans with a sense of hope 
that their country could move forward, away from the brutalities of the past” 
(Govier, 2002, 77; Kohen 2009). 
While the magnanimity of Nelson Mandela set the stage for a peaceful transi-
tion to multiethnic democracy in South Africa and laid the groundwork for po-
litical reconciliation between blacks and whites, it is likely far too soon to declare 
the process a complete success. In the Rwandan case, however, the most difficult 
work has yet to begin, for several reasons. First, and perhaps most obviously, the 
architects of the genocide have not been effectively held accountable for the irrep-
arable harm they caused. Although handfuls have been prosecuted at the inter-
national level, as discussed above, the adversarial, retributive nature of the ICTR 
discourages honesty from the accused in the dock. Perhaps no clearer example 
can be found than of the defense put forward by Georges Rutaganda, whose at-
torney argued that 
It is not Hutus who are guilty of this so-called genocide. We are convinced there 
was no genocide. It was a situation of mass killings in a state of war where ev-
eryone was killing their enemies …. There are a million people dead, but who 
are they? They are 800,000 Hutus and 200,000 Tutsis. Everyone was killing but 
the real victims are the Hutus. So they’ve got this so-called genocide all wrong 
(qtd. in Sarkin, 2001, 150). 
Though a great deal of lip service has been paid to reconciliation, then, it seems 
clear that no public apology is forthcoming from those on trial at the ICTR, those 
convicted and serving prison terms for their roles in the genocide, or those who 
still remain at large. 
In addition to the Rutaganda case, the stories of Jean Paul Akayesu and Au-
gustin Misago highlight the rationalizations made by prominent Hutu officials 
accused of genocide. As the mayor of the Taba commune in April 1994, Akayesu 
was the primary authority figure in the area at the outset of the genocide. In the 
early hours of April 19, after an interahamwe militia member was killed, Akayesu 
made a public speech in which he declared that he held in his hands information 
about a Tutsi plan to exterminate Hutu; to emphasize his point, he waved pa-
pers in the air (Benesch, 2004, 64). In the immediate aftermath of this speech, the 
Taba commune exploded in violence. Akayesu’s case was one of the first to be 
brought before the ICTR and, as the trial got underway, it became apparent that 
the evidence of his guilt in inciting genocide was overwhelming. In his defense, 
Akayesu offered a variety of rationalizations, including outright denial of any in-
volvement in acts of sexual violence that took place in Taba. In the final decision 
against Akayesu, the President of the ICTR nicely summarizes the defense that 
Akayesu presented: 
In the opinion of the Chamber, the defence case in essence is that he did not 
commit, order to be committed, or in any way aid and facilitate the acts with 
which he is charged in the indictment. Akayesu concedes nonetheless, that 
massacres aimed mainly at Tutsi took place in Taba commune in 1994. The de-
fence argues that Jean Paul Akayesu was helpless to prevent the commission of 
such acts because the balance of fouls in the commune was in favour of the In-
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terahamwe, who were under the strict authority of one Silas Nkubimana …. 
It submits that as soon as the massacres became widespread, the accused was 
stripped of all authority and lacked the means to stop the killings. The defence 
state or stated further that Jean Paul Akayesu could not be required to be a hero 
to lay down his life in a futile attempt to prevent the massacres (Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, 1998, 7–8). 
There are a few points in Akayesu’s defense that are particularly worth highlight-
ing: first, he was divested of previous authority during the genocide; second, the 
interahamwe exercised primary authority in Taba; and third, there should not be 
any positive requirement of action on his part, as any attempt to stop the massa-
cres would have been in vain. 
Interestingly, the identical points are made by Augustin Misago, the Bishop 
of Ginkongoro, in his informal defense of his actions during the genocide. In 
a country where more than half of the populace identifies as Roman Catholic, 
Misago held a position of considerable influence in his prefecture. On May 4, 
the Bishop visited a group of ninety Tutsi schoolchildren, to whom he promised 
protection; a few days after his visit, the police massacred all of the children. 
Misago is also suspected of denying refuge to fleeing Tutsi and commenting to 
a Vatican representative that the Pope should “find a place for Tutsi priests be-
cause the Rwandan people do not want them anymore” (Gourevitch, 1998, 137). 
The claim of helplessness, put forward by Akayesu, is also made by Misago, 
who explains to Gourevitch (1998, 138), “I don’t have an army. What could I do 
by myself? Nothing. That’s elementary logic.” In addition to his inability to as-
sist those in need, he claims ignorance with regard to the deaths of the school-
children: “The unfortunate thing was that among those policemen there were 
some accomplices of the interahamwe. I couldn’t have known that. These deci-
sions were made in the army” (Gourevitch, 1998, 138). Although Misago was 
eventually acquitted of participating in the genocide by a Rwandan court, it is 
clear that—despite his position of influence—he failed to assist those in need 
(Simpson, 2000, 1). 
What is striking about all three men—Rutaganda, Akayesu, and Misago—
is the focus they place on their own victimization. Rutaganda’s attorney claims 
that the genocide was actually committed against the Hutu rather than by them, 
Akayesu’s defense rests largely on his assertion that he was forced to flee the 
genocidal interahamwe himself, and Misago argues that he was the victim of mis-
information at the time and remains the victim of a political conspiracy against 
the Catholic Church. These high-ranking officials hold a starkly contrasting view 
of events that transpired during the genocide from the one held by Tutsi victims. 
This gap in perception makes the possibility of political reconciliation especially 
bleak at present. Without basic agreement about the facts of the genocide—for ex-
ample, that large numbers of Hutu citizens murdered their Tutsi neighbors and 
not the other way around—it becomes virtually impossible to reestablish trust be-
tween the antagonistic groups. The adversarial nature of the ICTR and Rwandan 
court proceedings creates a zero-sum game for defendants, discouraging them 
from being truthful about their roles in the genocide and encouraging rational-
izations that might result in winning the game against prosecutors. If these prom-
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5 In the 2008 Freedom House Report, Rwanda scored a 6 and a 5 for Political Rights and Civil Liber-
ties, respectively; these scores range from 1 to 7, with 7 being considered the “Least Free.” Rwanda 
scored identically in 1993, just months prior to the genocide. 
inent members of the offending group cannot express any recognition that they 
and their group are at fault for the harm that occurred, any forgiveness offered by 
the victimized group “will have all the force of an extended but unshaken hand” 
(Govier, 2002, 145). 
Of course, it is also the case that the policies intended, by the Tutsi-led govern-
ment, to foster political reconciliation within Rwanda are clearly implemented at 
a time and in a fashion that is decidedly in the sole interest of the RPF leadership. 
At the beginning of 2003, nearly 9 years after the genocide, an unelected execu-
tive ruled Rwanda and the populace was governed without a definitive consti-
tution. The August 2003 elections saw Paul Kagame—the military genius behind 
the RPF’s victory over the Hutu-led government’s forces in 1994—win the presi-
dency with a stunning 98% of the vote. Although the percentage is an outrageous 
one, the election received far less attention for its outcome than it did for com-
ments made by Kagame, who “warned that he would ‘wound’ ‘divisionists’ who 
threatened to undermine national unity and reprimanded foreign donors who 
give money to ‘people to teach divisions’” (Des Forges, 1999; cf. Temple-Raston, 
2005, 217–220). The election merely confirmed Kagame’s political control over the 
country, as he had ascended to the presidency in 2000, following the ouster of 
then-President Pasteur Bizimungu (Temple-Raston, 2005, 226; 113). However, it 
is also noteworthy that European Union observers witnessed instances of ballot-
stuffing and procedural miscounting on ballots (Harding, 2003, 1). Further, the 
EU noted that the method of voting – by fingerprint – could very easily allow for 
the identification of voting choices made by the electorate (Reyntjens, 2004, 186). 
Numerous human rights and intergovernmental organizations also expressed 
concern about voter intimidation and threats leading up to and on election day. 
Writing for the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, Samset and Dalby (2003, 
45) aptly observe that 
While Rwanda set an example to follow when it comes to the technical con-
duct of the polls, the NORDEM team remains concerned about the forceful 
signs, conveyed from a host of sources, that the electorate was strongly influ-
enced to vote for the ruling party. The influences they were subject to, both 
prior to the campaigns, throughout them and on the days of election, com-
bined to form a heavy pressure. Given the weight on this pressure on the indi-
vidual voter, it can be questioned if Rwandans at large actually felt that they 
had a choice. 
In addition to a general respect for human rights, an element of fair governance 
is necessary to escape a cycle of repression in emerging from ethnic conflict. 
Free and fair elections still have yet to take place in Rwanda, which continues to 
plague the process of political reconciliation. In fact, a quick comparison of Free-
dom House Reports between the years 1993 and 2008 suggest that Rwanda has 
made no substantive progress in the areas of both political rights and civil liber-
ties (Freedom House, 2008).5 
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Nor have intimidation tactics by the RPF been limited exclusively to the 
2003 election. In March 2005, Charles Kabonero, a Rwandan newspaper editor, 
was convicted of the vaguely defined crime of “divisionism” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2006, 2). In a recent human rights workshop in Rwanda, a discussion be-
gan about the current state of individual rights and Placide M. (2007), a partici-
pant who worked as a journalist, spoke privately about two colleagues who had 
been fired days earlier after writing articles that criticized Paul Kagame. Prob-
lems with the media are no surprise, particularly as the government has pro-
mulgated several vague laws that outlaw “genocidal ideology” and “division-
ism,” and frequently interprets dissent as precisely these violations (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006, 1; 3). Paul Kagame routinely suggests he is unifying fig-
ure and that the RPF-led government provides stability to a country that des-
perately needs it; thus, when individuals are critical of Kagame or the govern-
ment, they are often arrested for attempting to undermine the unity of Rwanda 
(Mgbako, 2005, 206–207). Although both unity and stability are very important 
characteristics of a society emerging from the chaos and violence experienced 
during the genocide and its aftermath, critical examination and dissenting opin-
ions are also necessary features of a fractured society that is on the mend. In 
their absence, there is little accountability for policies that are said to be in the 
best interest of political reconciliation but which might actually be meant to 
keep Kagame and the RPF in power. 
In addition to the notable lack of dissent or debate regarding Rwanda’s lead-
ership, there remains the intransigent problem of determining the proper role 
of the charged terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” in Rwandan culture. The government 
has instituted Ingando solidarity camps that implement reeducation programs 
with the purpose of eliminating these ethnic identity terms (Mgbako, 2005, 218). 
The terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were used by the Belgians as political tools to 
ensure the profitability of their colony; while the distinction existed prior to 
the colonial period, the privileging of the Tutsis by the Belgians left a deep di-
vide that became the basis for cycles of violence and oppression that eventu-
ally yielded the genocide. And, though these terms were largely applied arbi-
trarily, according to racial mythology, they are very much a part of the lived 
experience of ordinary Rwandans, especially since ethnically motivated vio-
lence became so commonplace following decolonization (Gourevitch, 1998, 47–
62). On the surface, then, the policies of the government that seek to erase eth-
nic identity to form one Rwandan identity appear to make excellent sense. That 
said, a great many problems exist with the underlying assumptions used to jus-
tify policies such as the ethnic reeducation in Ingando camps. Marc Sommers 
and Elizabeth McClintock (2003, 35) observe that “limiting talk about ethnicity 
does not eradicate its potency. It might just send it underground.” Indeed, the 
terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are no longer used in public, but the walls of pub-
lic restrooms are vandalized with ethnic slurs and threats made by members 
of both groups. Further, there is a considerable amount of discussion of eth-
nicity, in the privacy of individual homes, and it usually involves demeaning 
comments about one group or the other. One Rwandan woman, Godlives Ka-
rangwa (2007), astutely describes the current state of ethnic dialogue as “put-
ting fire under a table.” 
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A quick look at the population demographics of Rwanda makes clear that it 
is in the interest of Kagame and other Tutsi leadership in Rwanda to repress di-
alogue of ethnicity and ultimately erase the idea of ethnic groups in Rwanda to-
tally (Reyntjens, 2006, 1109). Assuming that Rwanda gradually does democra-
tize, instituting free and fair elections, there exists the very real possibility that 
individuals would vote largely along ethnic lines given the historical salience of 
“ethnicity” in Rwanda. This fact, coupled with the relatively low percentage of 
Tutsis in the aggregate population does not bode well for the current majority-
Tutsi government. As noted above, laws now exist regarding “genocidal ideol-
ogy” and “divisionism,” but vague definitions leave them open to interpretation; 
while these two terms are ostensibly used to label acts that could lead to geno-
cide, they are instead frequently used for political purposes. The political use of 
these terms to label dissidents, individuals who publically reference RPF war 
crimes, and even those who are defense witnesses in trials of prominent partici-
pants in the genocide is well documented (Human Rights Watch, 2008). While the 
espoused goals of eradicating “divisionism” and “genocidal ideology” are laud-
able, the methods undertaken by the Rwandan government to reach these goals 
are questionable at best. 
Deficiencies of Unity as Reconciliation
Thus far, we have covered a laundry list of problematic policies being imple-
mented on the ground in post-genocide Rwanda: the lack of free and fair elec-
tions, the lack of constructive dialogue on ethnicity, the political uses of “geno-
cidal ideology” and “divisionism,” the ICTR existing as the only transitional 
justice method to deal with prominent players in the genocide, ethnic reeduca-
tion in Ingando camps, and a general trend toward state centralization in Rwanda. 
Taken together, these policies adopted by the Rwandan executive and parlia-
ment amount to a sort of “reconciliation through unity” approach to dealing with 
the past. In the past 15 years, this emphasis on unity unquestionably benefitted 
the RPF and enabled it to maintain its hold on power (regardless of one’s posi-
tion on the fairness of the 2003 elections). However, this brand of “reconciliation” 
stands in contrast to the political reconciliation we advocate. Rather than offer-
ing forgiveness to prominent génocidaires, Kagame has urged the ICTR to trans-
fer their cases to Rwanda so they might be tried by a judicial system that does not 
meet international standards. This is not to suggest absolving the planners of the 
genocide of their crimes, a move which would effectively undermine hopes of 
accountability and justice for genocide victims and co-victims. Instead, we sug-
gest that high-level Tutsi officials must take progressive, public steps to ensure a 
sustainable reconciliation by working with, rather than opposing, the Hutu pop-
ulation. By failing to hold RPF soldiers accountable for war crimes in the wake 
of the genocide, the Rwandan government has conveniently allowed Hutus like 
Georges Rutagunda to remain comfortably entrenched in their belief that there 
will never be a just response to RPF reprisal killings. Furthermore, by effectively 
criminalizing the use of “ethnic” terminology, long-standing feelings of victim-
ization will remain buried. In a hushed but heated discussion behind closed 
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6 Gourevitch (1998, 37), recently writing in the New Yorker, observes that Paul Kagame is “unapolo-
getically authoritarian, and Rwanda’s stability has come at the expense of internal opposition and 
dissent.”
doors, journalist Placide M. (2007) asked, “In fifty years, who will we tell our chil-
dren who killed who?” Placide’s remark points to the fact the terms “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi” presently hold very real meaning to many Rwandans, regardless of the 
socially constructed origins of the terms. In fact, more than a million Rwandans 
have been systematically murdered based on these categories. To abruptly dis-
pose of them, then, does little to deal with the immense amount of weight and 
real world consequence they carried into the genocide, and that they still hold to 
the present day. 
Of course, in considering these observations, a reasonable, and frequently 
asked, question is whether a certain level of state centralization is necessary in 
Rwanda to “keep a lid” on Hutu-Tutsi tension.6 Certainly in the months and 
years immediately following the genocide this suggested method of conflict mit-
igation was absolutely vital for security measures. At this point in time, 15 years 
after the genocide, it seems clear that the level of state centralization that exists 
in Rwanda is actively working counter to hopes of achieving a sustainable peace. 
The politicization of gacaca, political involvement in the judiciary, ethnic reedu-
cation camps, and restrictions on free speech and expression are destructive to 
hopes of true democratization, reconciliation, and thus to hopes of preventing fu-
ture violent conflict. 
Conclusion
The lack of honest, public discussion about ethnicity in Rwanda poses seri-
ous problems for the process of political reconciliation. If these ethnic terms are 
wholly suppressed, it seemingly becomes impossible for the victimized group to 
forgive the offending group. For if the government was to undertake the difficult 
work of identifying prominent victims who might offer forgiveness to the Hu-
tus as a group—or if Kagame, himself a refugee of Hutu-led violence, were to act 
as Rwanda’s Mandela—these statements would be in direct contradiction of pol-
icies of ethnic reeducation. Further, the loose interpretation of terms like “geno-
cidal ideology” and “divisionism” discourage any sort of public dialogue on the 
role that ethnic identity can or should play in Rwandan society. This discourse 
could potentially be very useful in setting the stage for political reconciliation, 
as it could establish a common understanding between Hutus and Tutsis collec-
tively. Taken together, these policies not only move Rwanda further from a com-
prehensive attempt at political reconciliation, but make it virtually impossible for 
Hutus and Tutsis to begin rebuilding the trust that was so violently broken by the 
genocide. 
That said, the absence of accountability on the part of offenders poses a chal-
lenge every bit as serious. There is a powerful strain of denial on the part of so 
many Hutu that, coupled with their own sense of victimization, poses a terrible 
risk for the future of Rwanda. In the aftermath of the genocide, Gourevitch (1998, 
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262) visited and interviewed the Hutu leadership, refugees in Zaire, who explain 
that “Rwanda was terribly misunderstood in the world: yes, the country had suf-
fered a genocide, but it was carried out by the RPF, and Hutus had been the vic-
tims.” While not all Hutu murdered Tutsi—and while many have suffered as 
refugees, in Rwandan prisons, or due to the stigma of presumed guilt—the per-
sistence of the myth of an RPF-led genocide is likely to have disastrous conse-
quences. Indeed, one of the principal strategies employed by the architects of the 
genocide, in early 1994, was to claim that the invading RPF intended to take over 
Rwanda and either enslave or murder its rightful Hutu inhabitants for the bene-
fit of the Tutsi. These claims rang true to many Hutu due to the memory of collec-
tive victimization suffered at the hands of Tutsi during the colonial period. The 
continued emphasis on Hutu victimization encourages offenders to view their 
participation in the genocide as legitimate action in the face of their own potential 
victimization while clearly discouraging an apology to those Tutsi whose families 
were murdered or who were themselves in grave danger. This feeling of victim-
ization is furthered by the perception amongst Hutu that members of the RPF are 
not held accountable for crimes they committed, as neither the ICTR nor the ga-
caca courts have jurisdiction to try these crimes. 
Members of each group, then, can legitimately claim that they have been vic-
tims of violence and repression at the hands of members of the other. But, as Gov-
ier (2002, 153) points out, “A group’s acknowledgment of its own victimization 
poses dangers of a cult-like and ceremonial sharing of group pain. In the ‘we-
ness’ cultivated under the ethnic tent, a sense of victimhood may be created all 
too easily, and may too readily displace efforts to understand the complexities of 
the past.” What is needed, then, is an understanding of the past that is developed 
collectively, a new narrative that takes into account the complexity of everything 
that both groups have experienced. To attempt this work, Jeremy Sarkin (2001, 
167) suggests “a properly constituted, totally independent, non-government ap-
pointed commission in Rwanda,” without which “anger, resentment, hatred, and 
revenge might be the order of the day.” 
With an historical consensus on past human rights abuses as a solid foun-
dation, the Rwandan government would then need to overhaul a number of its 
post-genocide policies to truly encourage political reconciliation between Hutu 
and Tutsi groups. The Kagame government would do well to move more directly 
in the direction of restorative approaches to justice, as the zero-sum nature of re-
tributive judicial processes are typically not conducive to building trust and co-
operation between former antagonists. Indeed, the public executions and ques-
tionable court proceedings of the recent past have contributed to the continuation 
of a cycle of misunderstanding and distrust that took root in the colonial period. 
As many of the genocide’s planners have been tried, either by the ICTR or Rwan-
dan courts, future hopes for political reconciliation rest primarily on extra-judi-
cial initiatives that include forgiveness and public apology. The best chance of 
their success lies with leaders who might provide the necessary spark for politi-
cal reconciliation or even serve as a model for personal reconciliation. While this 
solution undoubtedly requires a great deal of work to be undertaken by both vic-
tims and offenders, who currently seem loath to do so, it sets the stage for a last-
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ing reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. In its absence, the future peace and 
stability of Rwanda remains an open and debatable question. 
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